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On June 26, 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New
Jersey,' holding that the Constitution requires that "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2 Although the
issue in Apprendi concerned a state statutory penalty enhancement,
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id. at 490.
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the decision has had a significant impact on the number of § 2255
motions3 filed by federal prisoners attacking their sentences.4
Specifically, many federal prisoners convicted under the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 5 have filed
§ 2255 petitions based on Apprendi. These prisoners claim that their
sentences have been unconstitutionally enhanced because the
quantity of drugs involved in their offenses was determined by a
judge at sentencing on a preponderance of the evidence,6 rather than
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as Apprendi mandates.7
Although the impact of the Apprendi decision on federal drug cases
pending on direct appeal has been fairly well settled,8 the issue of
whether the Apprendi rule is retroactive to cases on collateral
review-i.e., federal habeas corpus claims under § 2255-remains
unsettled by the Supreme Court.
Retroactivity asks "what to do when the law changes?"9 When a
judicial decision changes the law, the question of retroactivity boils
down to how a rule announced in a given case should govern other
cases. Three approaches to this question ask whether a specific rule
should govern:
(1) only future cases and neither the parties before the court
nor any previous or pending cases ("pure prospectivity"),
(2) future cases as well as the litigants at bar but not
previous or pending cases ("non-retroactivity"), or (3)
future cases, the present litigants, and all fact situations
3. The term "§ 2255 motion" refers to a motion made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
Section 2255 provides for a post-conviction remedy for a federal prisoner claiming that his
incarceration is unconstitutional. See § 2255. The remedy is intended to be the federal
counterpart of state habeas corpus. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354-55 (1994); Davis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344 (1974) ("[S]ection 2255 was intended to mirror [habeas
corpus statutes for state prisoners] in operative effect.").
4. See Talbot v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 868 (2000) (noting that there have been
"throngs of state and federal prisoners" who have relied on Apprendi to collaterally attack
their sentences).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 401, 84 Stat. 1236, 1260-61 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)) (criminalizing all aspects of unauthorized trade in controlled
substances including manufacture, distribution, possession, and conspiracy to engage in
any of these acts).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Hamm, 269 F.3d 1247, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2001) (denying
defendant's Apprendi claim based on the doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989));
United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 2001) (denying defendant's Apprendi
claim); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).
7. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
8. See infra cases cited note 27 (holding that Apprendi applies to cases on direct
review).
9. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of
Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1999).
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arising before the date of the law-changing decision that are
still reviewable either by direct appeal or by collateral attack
("retroactivity").°
The Supreme Court, as discussed below, has adopted a variation
of the third approach, i.e., a partial retroactivity approach. The
Supreme Court's current retroactivity doctrine, as announced in
Teague v. Lane" and developed through a subsequent line of cases,12
is an unsatisfactory method for adjudicating whether new
constitutional sentencing rules will apply retroactively to federal cases
on collateral review. Over the course of the past thirty-six years, the
Court has grappled with the issue of retroactivity and has crafted a
theoretically incoherent doctrine that has proven difficult to apply. 3
This Comment will illustrate the difficulty with the Court's
current retroactivity doctrine by applying it to the hypothetical case
of a federal prisoner incarcerated for a violation of the federal drug
statute 14 who raises a post-conviction claim based on the Apprendi
decision. The Introduction sets out a brief explanation of the
retroactivity issue in the context of a federal drug prisoner's Apprendi
10. Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61
VA. L. REV. 1557, 1557 n.2 (1975). The situation that Professor Beytagh calls "non-
retroactivity" is also referred to as "selective prospectivity." See Roosevelt, supra note 9,
at 1092.
11. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Under Teague, a new rule of constitutional law will not be
available to a § 2255 petitioner as a basis to attack his sentence unless either (1) the new
rule places an "entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law"
or prohibits imposition of a certain punishment on an entire class of defendants; or (2) the
new rule is a "watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure" that both improves the accuracy of
a conviction and " 'alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements'
essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241-42 (1990)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
12. See, e.g., Horn v. Banks, 122 S. Ct. 2147, 2150 (2002) (holding that a federal court
must apply the Teague analysis if the State raises the issue in a federal habeas proceeding
despite the state court's failure to consider retroactivity); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
382-84 (2000) (holding that the definition of a "new rule" for retroactivity purposes on
collateral review is to be determined by reference to Supreme Court precedent); Bousley
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (holding Teague inapplicable to changes of
substantive construction of federal statutes); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372-73
(1993) (holding that when a new rule is favorable to the state, Teague allows retroactive
application of that rule to cases on collateral review). For cases interpreting what
constitutes a "new" rule for retroactivity purposes, see Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234; Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). The Court
has also clarified how lower courts are to apply the Teague analysis and clarified the scope
of the Teague exceptions. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997); Caspari
v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
13. See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence is
"somewhat chaotic").
14. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
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claim filed under § 2255. Part I gives an overview of the development
of the Court's modern retroactivity doctrine beginning with Linkletter
v. Walker15 and continuing through Teague v. Lane and its progeny.
Part II examines how the Court's current retroactivity doctrine has
been applied by lower courts and how the current doctrine
malfunctions in the context of federal prisoners' § 2255 motions. Part
III presents and adopts the "decision-time" model of retroactivity
proposed by Professor Roosevelt in a recent article16 and extends that
model to federal habeas petitioners raising claims directly attacking
the length of their sentences. Part IV argues that the extended
decision-time model addresses the infirmities of Teague in the federal
context. This Comment concludes that by applying the extended
decision-time model, thus making current law available to federal
prisoners who claim that the lengths of their sentences are
unconstitutional, a court could decide whether to apply Apprendi or a
similar new rule to a § 2255 motion with significantly more doctrinal
clarity than it could by applying the present partial retroactivity
model.
INTRODUCTION
The codified version of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 197011 includes 21 U.S.C. § 841.
Section 841(a) prohibits manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, and
possessing a controlled substance, with the intent to engage in any of
these activities. 8 Section 841(b) establishes a complex penalty
structure based on the type and quantity of drug involved in the
crime. 9 The three main subsections of § 841(b) set out increasing
maximum sentences corresponding to increased quantities of various
types of drugs.20 Prior to Apprendi, maximum penalties based on
15. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
16. See Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1117-19.
17. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 401, 84 Stat. 1236, 1260-61 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); see SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO
§ 9.2, at 256-57 (1998) (referring to the offenses listed in § 841(a) as the "core offenses").
19. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
20. Compare id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (setting out a life imprisonment maximum on a first
offense for specified quantities), and id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (setting out a forty-year maximum
imprisonment for a first offense based on specified quantities), with id. § 841(b)(1)(C)
(setting out a twenty-year maximum imprisonment for a first offense "[i]n the case of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II [and other named substances] except as provided
in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D)"). Courts have held that the twenty-year maximum of
§ 841(b)(1)(C) also applies where the quantity of Schedule I or II drugs is unspecified. See
2003] 1223
1224 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
drug quantity were determined at a sentencing hearing by a judge
who made factual findings of drug quantity on a preponderance of the
evidence. 21 Assume, for example, that Bob, a hypothetical federal
defendant, was convicted on a one-count indictment for a violation of
§ 841(a). If the federal judge found at sentencing that Bob was
distributing 4.99 grams of crack cocaine,22 the maximum penalty he
would face would be twenty years.23 If that same judge found on a
preponderance of the evidence that Bob's violation of § 841(a)
involved 5.00 grams of crack cocaine, the statutory maximum penalty
would be forty years.24  Now assume Fred, another defendant, was
convicted of a violation of § 841(a) involving 5.00 grams of crack
cocaine. Fred, however, has a prior felony drug conviction. Under
the federal drug law, Fred would face a maximum of life in prison.25
In contrast, if the judge found that Fred's violation of § 841(a)
involved only 4.99 grams of crack cocaine, Fred would be subject to a
thirty-year maximum sentence.26 Thus, as this example demonstrates,
a judge's decision that it is merely more likely than not that a
defendant was involved in a drug violation involving 5.00 grams, as
opposed to 4.99 grams, can have serious consequences for a
defendant.
United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 661 & n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069
(2001); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
2296 (2002); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1177 (2001).
21. See WELLING ET AL., supra note 18, § 9.3(A), at 259 (noting the pre-Apprendi
rule that drug quantity was relevant only at the sentencing stage where it was established
by a preponderance of the evidence); Alan Ellis et al., Apprehending and Appreciating
Apprendi, 15 CRIM. JUST. 16, 17 (2001) (noting that drug quantity was decided by a judge
on a preponderance of the evidence before Apprendi).
22. Crack cocaine is referred to in § 841(b) as "cocaine base." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b); see
also United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 94 (1995) (noting that "cocaine base" is also
known as crack cocaine).
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (setting out a twenty-year maximum imprisonment
for the first offense "[i]n the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II [and other
named substances], except as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D)"). The
enhanced penalties of § 841(b)(1)(B), the next most severe sentencing provision, take
effect for offenses involving 5.00 grams or more of "cocaine base," i.e., crack cocaine. See
id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii); supra note 22. Crack cocaine is a Schedule II substance. See id.
§ 812 (c). Section 841(b)(1)(C) also applies a twenty-year maximum for a violation of
§ 841(a) that involves an unspecified amount of a Schedule I or II controlled substance.
See Thomas, 274 F.3d at 661; Promise, 255 F.3d at 156; Doggett, 230 F.3d at 165.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that "[i]n the case of a violation of
subsection (a) of this section involving ... 5 grams or more of a mixture or substance ...
which contains cocaine base ... such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
which may not be ... more than 40 years").
25. Id.
26. See id. § 841(b)(1)(C); Doggett, 230 F.3d at 166.
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After Apprendi, if the government seeks an enhanced penalty
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B) based on the quantity of drugs,
the quantity must be alleged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.27 Due to the large number of
federal prisoners serving sentences for drug convictions, 28 the
Apprendi decision has prompted many prisoners to file § 2255
motions attacking the lengths of their sentences. 9 On direct review,3"
a cognizable Apprendi claim arises in a case where a defendant has
actually received a sentence beyond what is supported by the factual
findings of the jury.31 On the other hand, if a judge's determination of
the quantity of drugs only exposes a defendant to an increased
sentence, but the defendant actually receives a sentence that is within
the statutory maximum for an undetermined quantity of a particular
drug, there is no constitutional violation under Apprendi 2
27. Under Apprendi, if the type and quantity of drugs involved in a charged crime are
used to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum for an otherwise undetermined
quantity of drugs, then the type and quantity of drugs are an element of the offense that
must be charged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. See, e.g., Thomas, 274 F.3d
at 660 n.3 (appealing a conviction of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base); Doggett, 230 F.3d at 164-65 (appealing a conviction
for possession of methamphetamine); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1053 (9th
Cir. 2000) (appealing a conviction for possession of marijuana); United States v. Aguayo-
Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (appealing a conviction for possession of
methamphetamine).
28. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, in fiscal year 2000 alone,
24,179 defendants were sentenced for violations of the federal drug laws. See UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 12, Guideline Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category (Table 3),
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/SBTOC00.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
29. See Talbot v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 868 (2000) (noting that there have been
"throngs of state and federal prisoners" who have relied on Apprendi to collaterally attack
their sentences).
30. "Direct review" describes the appeals process prior to a defendant's conviction
becoming "final." According to the Supreme Court, a defendant's conviction is "final" if a
judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal has been exhausted,
and the time for petition for certiorari has elapsed. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258
n.1 (1986).
31. The Apprendi rule applies to all cases pending on direct review at the time
Apprendi was announced. See Thomas, 274 F.3d at 663-64; infra note 90 and
accompanying text. In Thomas, the Second Circuit held that, under Apprendi, drug
quantity is an element of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and further held that where the
defendant received a 292-month sentence based on drug quantity findings made by a judge
on a preponderance of the evidence, the correct remedy is to remand to the lower court
for resentencing pursuant to the lower twenty-year statutory maximum applicable under
§ 841(b)(1)(C). Thomas, 274 F.3d at 673.
32. The federal courts of appeals have agreed that Apprendi is inapplicable any time a
judge's drug quantity determination at sentencing actually results in a sentence that is less
than or equal to the base statutory maximum applicable to an undetermined quantity of
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The question raised in the lower federal courts has been whether
the Apprendi decision applies retroactively to cases collaterally
challenged in a § 2255 motion. As one court noted, if Apprendi is
held to be retroactive, it "could well lead to overwhelming and
disastrous results given that every court in every jurisdiction in the
country has treated drug quantity as a sentencing factor for the judge
to determine for well over ten years."33 Because of this long-standing
practice of sentencing federal drug prisoners, the Apprendi rule could
have a substantial impact on many federal sentences if the rule
applies to petitioners' constitutional claims brought under § 2255.
I. THE COURT'S RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
Prior to 1965, the Supreme Court generally applied all new
constitutional rules retroactively to cases on collateral review-i.e.,
cases brought post-conviction seeking a writ of habeas corpus.34 This
practice grew out of the Blackstonian declaratory theory that judges
find law rather than make law, and that the best understanding of the
law at any given time should be applied to any case that comes to
court.35 This general rule changed in Linkletter v. Walker,36 where the
the drug at issue in the case, regardless of whether the quantity determination exposed the
defendant to a sentence above that base statutory maximum. See Horton v. United States,
244 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 119-22 (1st Cir.
2001); United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410,
413-14 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 223, 231-32 (4th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2000); Doggett, 230 F.3d at 165;
United States v. Egge, 223 F.3d 1128, 1131 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d
at 933-34.
33. United States v. Pittman, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (D. Or. 2000).
34. See, e.g., Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43, 44 (1964) (holding that a right to a
preliminary determination by the judge, not the jury, of voluntariness of confession
announced in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), applied retroactively to a habeas
corpus petition); Eskridge v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214,
216 (1958) (per curiam) (holding the right to a free trial transcript for an indigent
defendant announced in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), applied retroactively to a
habeas corpus petition).
35. Blackstone stated his theory of the law as follows:
These judicial decisions are the principal and the most authoritative evidence
that can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the
common law .... Yet this rule admits of exceptions where the former
determination is most evidently contrary to reason .... But even in such cases
the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old
one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is
manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law,
but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm,
as had been erroneously determined.
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Court held that the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio3 7 would not
apply to cases where convictions had become final prior to the date
Mapp was announced.38 Acknowledging that the Court had always
applied a new constitutional rule to cases that were final before the
new rule was announced, the Court nevertheless stated that "the
Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.
39
Thus, the exclusionary rule would apply only to cases pending on
direct review at the time Mapp was announced and to future cases,
but not to cases on collateral review.
The Court in Linkletter was faced with a large number of state
convictions that could be affected by applying the exclusionary rule
retroactively, which would, in turn, potentially have a substantial and
negative impact on federal-state relations.4" Prior decisions of the
Court already had created significant burdens for state criminal
justice systems, and with the announcement of the Mapp exclusionary
rule, the states almost instantly resisted applying the rule to habeas
petitions." In light of the states' resistance, Justice Clark announced
a new analytical framework for deciding if new rules would be held
retroactive or prospective. The Court set out a three factor test,
weighing: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the reliance placed by
parties on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of
justice if the rule were to be held retroactive.42  Because (1) the
purpose of the new exclusionary rule was to deter unlawful police
conduct; (2) states had relied on the rule in effect prior to Mapp that
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence was not compelled by the
Fourth Amendment; and (3) retroactive application would seriously
Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907,908 (1962) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68-71 (1769)).
36. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
37. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The "exclusionary rule" is a constitutional remedy that
prevents federal and state law enforcement from using evidence against an accused that
was gathered in an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, in the case of federal law enforcement, or in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, in the case of state law enforcement. See id. at 657-60.
38. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639-40.
39. Id. at 629-30.
40. See James B. Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of
the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 420-24 (1969)
(noting that Mapp would place a heavy burden upon state criminal justice systems either
because the state did not have the resources to defend against claims of unlawful seizures
or because essential evidence had been unlawfully seized and offered at trial).
41. See id. at 422 (noting the immediate reaction to Mapp urging that the states be
"spared the impact of a retroactive application") (citing Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio
At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 341-42).
42. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
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disrupt the administration of justice, the newly formed retroactivity
test counseled against applying the rule to the habeas petitioner's
case.
43
The next two cases to address the question of retroactivity in the
criminal context were Johnson v. New Jersey' and Stovall v. Denno 5
In Johnson, the Court held that the rules governing police
interrogations announced in Escobedo v. Illinois46 and Miranda v.
Arizona47 would apply only to defendants whose trials started after
the standards established by those cases were announced.48 Similarly,
the Stovall Court held that the rule announced in two companion
cases, United States v. Wade49 and Gilbert v. California,50 requiring
counsel at pretrial lineups, would apply only to the actual Wade and
Gilbert defendants and not to Stovall, a habeas petitioner, or any
other case pending on direct review,51 even though all three decisions
were announced on the same day. In neither of these cases did the
Court focus on whether the case was on direct or collateral review to
determine who would benefit from the rules announced. Instead, it
determined the retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a new rule either
by reference to a trial date, as in Johnson, or by whether a particular
defendant was fortunate enough to have been the litigant in the rule-
changing case, as in Stovall.52 This "selective prospectivity" created
an unfair situation in which two defendants whose constitutional
rights had been infringed in exactly the same way and who stood in
the exact same procedural posture-direct review-but who
underwent either an interrogation or a pretrial lineup at different
times, would be treated differently. 3 Recognizing that "[i]nequity
arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the
parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants
similarly situated," the Court nevertheless reasoned that this
43. Id. at 636-39.
44. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
45. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 732.
49. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
50. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
51. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967).
52. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296; Johnson, 384 U.S. at 732.
53. See Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1092 (arguing that even though the Stovall decision
had the apparently beneficial effect of unifying the treatment of direct and collateral
review, different treatment of similarly situated defendants was not only unfair but
"openly incoherent when both cases came to the Court in the same procedural posture").
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unfairness was "an insignificant cost for adherence to sound
principles of decision-making."54
The Court continued applying new rules in this selective way in
Desist v. United States. At issue in Desist was the retroactivity of the
eavesdropping rule the Court adopted in Katz v. United States.56 The
Desist decision refined a key aspect of the retroactivity doctrine.57
The Court stated that the question of non-retroactivity arises only
when the law is significantly altered-i.e., when a rule constitutes a
"clear break with the past."58 Further, the Desist Court held that the
Katz rule would not be applicable even to cases pending on direct
review if the challenged wiretap had occurred prior to the date Katz
was announced 9.5  This opinion echoed the Stovall theme that even
though it may be inequitable to only apply a new rule to the parties in
the case announcing the rule, this inequity was tolerable.
Justice Harlan voiced his objection to the Court's practice of
holding new constitutional rules of criminal procedure non-
retroactive in similarly situated cases-other cases pending on direct
review at the time the new rule was announced. He noted the
doctrinal confusion as follows:
In the four short years since we embraced the notion that
our constitutional decisions in criminal cases need not be
retroactively applied, we have created an extraordinary
collection of rules to govern the application of that principle.
We have held that certain "new" rules are to be applied to
all cases then subject to direct review, certain others are to
be applied to all those cases in which trials have not yet
commenced, certain others are to be applied to all those
cases in which the tainted evidence has not yet been
introduced at trial, and still others are to be applied only to
the party involved in the case in which the new rule is
54. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301.
55. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. As one commentator has noted, Desist "produced the most definitive and
exhaustive treatment of the non-retroactivity doctrine since its birth in Linkletter."
Beytagh, supra note 10, at 1570.
58. Desist, 394 U.S. at 248. For sources discussing what, exactly, constitutes a new
rule for purposes of retroactivity analysis, see infra note 139.
59. Desist, 394 U.S. at 254. In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the
deterrence purpose of Fourth Amendment rules and reasoned that a retroactive
application of the Katz rule would not serve that purpose. Id. at 253-54.
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announced and to all future cases in which the proscribed
official conduct has not yet occurred.6 °
Justice Harlan's view was that new constitutional rules should be
uniformly applied to cases pending on direct review because to
"simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants
those who alone will receive the benefit of a 'new' rule of
constitutional law" was a violation of jurisprudential principle.61
Justice Harlan did not, however, advocate applying new
constitutional rules uniformly to cases on collateral review, in part
because recent decisions of the Supreme Court had expanded the
availability of habeas corpus review for state and federal prisoners.62
This expansion led Justice Harlan to argue that the Linkletter test of
purpose, reliance, and effect was an inappropriate test to apply to
habeas petitions because that test did not adequately take into
consideration what he believed to be the purposes of collateral
review.63 Under Harlan's view, one purpose of federal habeas corpus
review was to prevent incarceration of the innocent defendant.'
Thus, only new constitutional rules that "significantly improve the
pre-existing fact-finding procedures" should be applied to cases on
collateral review. 65 The other function of habeas was to provide an
incentive for trial and appellate courts to conduct their proceedings in
accordance with constitutional standards.66 This deterrence function
60. Id. at 256-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). During this era, the
Court was attempting to find the correct temporal limitation on the retroactive effect of
new constitutional decisions. One commentator classified these limitations into three
categories: "(1) the trial date rule; (2) the final judgment rule; and (3) the violation date
rule." See Barry Robert Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court
Constitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y. L. F. 289, 297 n.47 (1973) (citing Phillip Johnson,
Forward: The Supreme Court of California, 1967-68, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1612, 1613 (1968)).
These three limitations applied, respectively, to three situations: (1) cases where the trial
had not yet commenced when the new rule is announced; (2) cases pending on direct
appeal; and (3) to proscribed conduct occurring after the new rule was handed down. See
id.
61. Desist, 394 U.S. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (expanding the scope of
§ 2255 petitions to include a claim of illegal search and seizure); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
398-99 (1963) (holding that the doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to
constitute an adequate and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court
review is not to be extended to limit the power granted to federal courts under federal
habeas corpus statutes).
63. Desist, 394 U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[P]rincipled habeas retroactivity
now seems to me to demand much more than the 'purpose,' 'reliance,' and judicial
'administration' standards .... ").
64. See id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 262-63. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of habeas did not require a retroactive application of new
constitutional rules; deterrence could be served by simply applying
the constitutional rules in effect at the time of the proceeding.67
Justice Harlan's position did not command a majority of the
Court, and the Court continued to apply new constitutional rules
using the Linkletter standard without regard to the procedural
posture of the case.68 In 1971, the Court decided Mackey v. United
States,6 9 a case presented on collateral review involving a challenge to
an income tax evasion conviction.7°  The petitioner in Mackey
unsuccessfully sought the benefit of two Supreme Court opinions
decided subsequent to his conviction that held that certain evidence
admitted against the petitioner could not be admitted at trial
constitutionally. 1  Concurring in the Court's denial of Mackey's
habeas motion, Justice Harlan again argued for the uniform
treatment of cases on direct review, and criticized the Court's
retroactivity doctrine for creating an unprincipled practice of
"[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using
it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then
permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by
unaffected by that new rule. '72 Admitting that he and other members
of the Court had initially accepted the Linkletter non-retroactivity
principle as a way to constrain the activist Warren Court's criminal
procedure decisions, he argued that the Court's resultant selective
prospectivity doctrine was more akin to legislative rulemaking than
principled adjudication.73
67. See id. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. For in-depth coverage and a critique of the Court's selective prospectivity
decisions between 1965 and 1975, see generally Beytagh, supra note 10. Noting "the
inequality plainly apparent in the Court's current approach," id. at 1616, Professor
Beytagh argues that the inequality that results from applying a decision to the litigants in a
given case, but not to others similarly situated procedurally, could be solved by adopting a
"pure prospectivity" approach, i.e., announcing a new rule and only applying it to cases
arising after the law-changing decision. Id. For detailed discussion and synthesis of cases
applying the Linkletter standard from 1975 to 1982, see generally Fred Bernard Corr,
Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine 'As Applied', 61 N.C. L. REV. 745
(1983).
69. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
70. Id. at 672.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice
Harlan's view, the Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine ... entail[ed] an inexplicable
and unjustifiable departure from the basic principle upon which rests the institution of
judicial review." Id. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. See id. at 676-77 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Taking a position similar to that in his Desist dissent, Justice
Harlan again argued that new rules generally should not be applied to
cases on collateral review. Noting that habeas "is not designed as a
substitute for direct review,"74 he concluded that the government's
interest in finality would, in most cases, outweigh a prisoner's interest
in relitigating a case already settled.75 Justice Harlan's view of the
importance of finality in the criminal process has two components.
First, finality means that there is a "visible end" to the criminal
process which would afford both society and defendants the
opportunity to turn attention away from a past trial and focus on the
future treatment of an incarcerated defendant and the efforts to
restore the convict to a "useful place in the community."76 Second,
finality preserves resources of the criminal justice system by ensuring
that those resources are not drained litigating past trial procedures
that were constitutional when implemented.77 Justice Harlan did,
however, recognize two exceptions to the general principle that new
constitutional rules should not be retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review. First, an exception would be appropriate for rules
placing constitutional limits on the government's power to proscribe
conduct.7" Second, an exception would exist "for claims of
nonobservance of those procedures that ... are 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.' "I' In formulating these two exceptions,
Justice Harlan modified the position he took in Desist, where he
74. Id. at 683 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan
also argued that the interest in finality of a criminal conviction would support a narrow
construction of the scope of the habeas statute such that the Court could simply remove
issues cognizable on habeas to serve this interest. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). A direct limitation on the scope of habeas would be more
theoretically consistent than the development of a new retroactivity doctrine.
75. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 690-91 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 691 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining these
rules as those that "place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe"). The Supreme Court has stated that this exception applies not
only when an actor's primary conduct cannot be constitutionally proscribed, but also when
the imposition of the death penalty on a class of defendants has been constitutionally
proscribed. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989).
79. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), and further
defining these rules as those that "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction"). An
example of a decision requiring retroactive application under this exception is Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established a right to counsel in all felony cases.
See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996).
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placed primary importance on rules that implicated the adequacy of
the fact-finding process,80 and concluded that the interest in the
finality of criminal convictions would best be served by reference to
the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" standard enunciated in
Palko v. Connecticut.
81
The Court adopted Justice Harlan's view that new rules should
uniformly apply on direct review in a series of decisions beginning
with United States v. Johnsons 2 and Shea v. Louisiana.83 Noting that
the general rule of non-retroactivity was only applicable if a rule was
"new," i.e., a "clear break with the past,"'8 the Court held in both
cases that the constitutional decisions on which the petitioners were
relying were not "new" rules and thus were retroactively applicable;
neither the Fourth Amendment rule in Payton v. New York85 nor the
Fifth Amendment rule in Edwards v. Arizona86 constituted a "clear
break with the past."87 Thus, the appellants on direct review could
benefit from these prior decisions.
Then, in Griffith v. Kentucky,88 the Court abandoned the
"newness of the rule" rationale and adopted wholesale Justice
80. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
81. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
82. 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982) (holding that the Fourth Amendment decision in Payton
v. New York should be applied to cases pending on direct review even where the alleged
Fourth Amendment violation took place before the decision relied on was rendered,
except in those situations that would be clearly controlled by existing retroactivity
precedents).
83. 470 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1985) (holding that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981), barring the use of a confession obtained in interrogation after a request for an
attorney, is applicable to a case pending on direct review, even where the interrogation
took place before the Edwards decision).
84. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969).
85. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
86. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
87. Shea, 470 U.S. at 59 n.5 ("Edwards was 'not the sort of "clear break" that is
automatically nonretroactive.' ") (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 647 (1984));
Johnson, 457 U.S. at 553-54 (stating that Payton did not "fall within the narrow class of
cases that were non-retroactive because those cases constituted 'a clear break with the
past.' ") (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)). Adopting a narrow
definition of what constitutes a new rule such that the rule would be applied retroactively,
the Johnson Court noted that Payton "rested on both long-recognized principles of Fourth
Amendment law and the weight of historical authority as it had appeared to the Framers
of the Fourth Amendment." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 552. Similarly, in Solem v. Stumes, 465
U.S. 638 (1984), the Court concluded that the Edwards rule was not sufficiently new to
warrant nonretroactive treatment because prior to Edwards the Court had "strongly
indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel" and
had referred to an accused's right to be free from further questioning once he invoked his
right to counsel "several times." Id. at 646-47. Thus, the Court concluded that Edwards
was not the sort of "clear break" case that is almost automatically nonretroactive. Id
88. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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Harlan's view that "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional
rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication."89 Following Harlan's view, the Griffith
Court adopted a bright-line rule mandating a new rule's retroactive
application to cases on direct review. 90 In an attempt to clarify the
doctrinal underpinnings of its retroactivity doctrine, the Court
abandoned the approach it had taken in cases such as Stovall and
Linkletter, where it had attempted to define the temporal reach of a
rule by reference to the time of the alleged violation, such as the date
of trial or a pre-trial lineup.91
Having settled the question of whether new rules would be
applied to appellants on direct review, the Court had yet to clarify a
uniform treatment of petitioners on collateral review. Prior to
announcing in Shea that the rule of Edwards would apply to cases on
direct review, for example, the Court had addressed the question of
whether that specific rule would be applicable to cases on collateral
review, answering that the rule should not be applied to habeas
petitions.92 The Court, however, left open the question of whether, as
a general principle, petitioners on collateral review should be treated
similarly to appellants on direct review.93
In the controversial decision 94 of Teague v. Lane and its
progeny, 95 the Court answered this question in the negative. The
89. Id. at 322.
90. Id. at 327-28 (holding that a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure applies
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, without
regard to whether a rule is a "clear break" with precedent).
91. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
92. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 (1984) (applying the Linkletter purpose,
reliance, and effect test and holding that the Edwards rule did not apply retroactively to a
habeas petitioner).
93. See Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,215-17 (1988).
94. The Teague decision generated a good deal of commentary, much of it negative.
See, e.g., Roger D. Branigin III, Sixth Amendment-The Evolution of the Supreme Court's
Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1128, 1147 (1989) ("The theoretical structure that the [Teague] plurality
constructed ... ultimately collapses in the absence of any substantive content."); Patrick
E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433, 2434-35 (1993) (noting the
criticism that the Teague doctrine "produce[d] a largely toothless habeas"); Yale L.
Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 374-75
(1991) ("The Teague exceptions do little ... because they apply only to crimes so offbeat
and punishments so cruel that they are beyond the constitutional pale, and to primitive
pre-incorporation-era due process violations featuring lynch mobs, corrupt prosecutors,
and cops with rubber hoses."); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2331, 2391 (1993) (arguing that the Teague "new rule" jurisprudence "would be
utterly bizarre if it were not so obviously contrived.., in service of political objectives").
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principle question raised by the habeas petitioner in Teague was
whether the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement
announced in Taylor v. Louisiana96 should be extended to apply to
the petit jury as well as the jury venire.97 In a plurality opinion,
Justice O'Connor held that because a rule requiring the Taylor fair
cross-section rule to be applied to the petit jury would not be applied
retroactively even if it were adopted, it was unnecessary to decide
whether the rule should be adopted.98 In so holding, the Court
created and applied a brand new retroactivity analysis, even though
the issue of retroactivity had not been raised or briefed by the
parties.99
Teague modified the Court's retroactivity doctrine in three
significant ways. First, and perhaps most significantly, the plurality
opinion modified the retroactivity analysis by stating that
"[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold issue.""' In prior
cases, the Court had only reached the question of retroactivity once a
new rule had been announced, either when a different defendant in a
later case sought the benefit of that rule, or in the very case
announcing the rule. 10 1 The plurality reasoned that "evenhanded
justice" required that if a case on collateral review were to announce
a new rule, the rule would have to be applied to all others "similarly
situated."'0 2 Because not all new rules would apply to habeas
petitioners, the issue of retroactivity of a potentially new rule should
be decided before considering the constitutional merits of the rule
itself.0 3 Put another way, "the question of the retroactivity of any
95. See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25.1 n.4, § 25.2 n.31 (3d ed. 1998) (analyzing and
interpreting post-Teague cases).
96. 419 U.S. 522, 526-33 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that a
panel of potential jurors-the "jury venire," from which a trial, or "petit," jury is
selected-must represent a fair cross-section of the community).
97. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989) (plurality opinion).
98. See id. at 299. The plurality reasoned that because a fair cross-section
requirement for a petit jury was not essential to fundamental fairness, and nor would it
seriously implicate the accuracy of criminal convictions, any petit jury fair-cross-section
rule would not be retroactive. See id. at 315. Thus, since the rule would not be retroactive
even if adopted, the plurality "simply refuse[d]" to answer the question of whether it was
the rule. See id. at 316. The plurality argued that there was "no other way to avoid
rendering advisory opinions." Id.
99. Id. at 300 (noting that the retroactivity issue had only been raised in an amicus
brief).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 299 (discussing cases deciding retroactivity of a prior decision and cases
that answered the retroactivity question after announcing a new rule).
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id. at 300-01.
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putatively 'new' rule for which a petitioner contends must be
addressed.., before the Court decides whether the rule the petitioner
proposes is the law.""
Second, noting that Griffith had settled the question of
retroactivity of new rules on direct review, 105 the plurality relied on
the value of finality of criminal judgments and adopted a "bright-
line" 106 standard of retroactivity that distinguished between direct
review and collateral review.'0 7 Relying on Justice Harlan's dissents
in Desist and Mackey, the plurality held that new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure generally should not be applied to cases on
collateral review unless they fall within one of two exceptions. 08 The
first exception is for rules that place "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe." 109  The second exception, an amalgam of
Justice Harlan's earlier views, excluded rules that both implicated
fundamental fairness and "seriously diminished" the likelihood of an
accurate conviction.110
104. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95, § 25.4, at 960. Liebman and Hertz point out
that in developing this aspect of the retroactivity analysis, the Court relied on the case of
Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), which did not address the order of the initial
announcement of a rule of law and a determination of that rule's retroactivity, but
addressed the "much less controversial question" of the order of the retroactivity analysis
of a "potentially new" rule announced in an earlier decision and that rule's application in a
subsequent case. See id. § 25.4 n.13. Arguably, the application of Apprendi to cases on
collateral review would represent the "much less controversial" case. However, as
discussed infra Part II.A, the operation of Apprendi on federal drug laws is distinguishable
from a straightforward application of a rule to an analogous set of facts because it
redefines the elements of federal crimes.
105. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 304.
106. Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1097 ("The current retroactivity jurisprudence in
criminal law has thus moved towards bright-line rules ... .
107. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-11.
108. See id. at 310.
109. Id. at 311. This exception applies to substantive constitutional rules. For example,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding that the right to abortion was a substantive due
process right, was held retroactive to a physician's conviction under New York's anti-
abortion manslaughter law because the conviction implicated a substantive freedom. See
United States ex rel. Williams v. Preiser, 360 F. Supp. 667, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Further,
the Court has construed this exception to apply not only to an actor's primary conduct, but
also to the substantive limits on the government's power to impose the death penalty. See
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989). Thus, the Court's recent decision in Atkins
v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002), holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
State from executing mentally retarded individuals, id. at 2252, applies retroactively. See
Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d. 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that Atkins applied
retroactively because the execution of the mentally retarded was "beyond the State's
power").
110. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. An example of a decision requiring retroactive
application under this exception is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which
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Third, the plurality adopted a somewhat confusing definition of
what constituted a "new" rule for retroactivity purposes. Conceding
that defining a new rule was a difficult task,' the plurality defined a
new rule as one that either "breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government," or one that was
"not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final.11 2 Applying this new analysis, the plurality
held that an extension of the Taylor cross-section requirement to the
petit jury would be a new rule,' and that the rule, if adopted, would
not fall within either exception to the general principle that new rules
should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review."'
There are a number of issues arising after Teague that bear
directly on how the retroactivity of Apprendi should be analyzed and
how the lower courts have handled the retroactivity question. First,
the Teague Court did not address the question of whether the Teague
analysis applied to new statutory substantive criminal law decisions.
The Court answered this question in the negative in Bousley v. United
States." 5 The petitioner in Bousley pled guilty to possessing with
intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of the federal drug
statute 16 and to using a firearm "during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime."'1 7 The petitioner filed a § 2255 motion, which was
established a right to counsel in all felony cases. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170
(1996) (referring to the Gideon rule as a "paradigmatic example" of the second Teague
exception). Commentators have agreed with the dissenting Justices in Teague that Justice
O'Connor's combination of Harlan's prior opinions did not accurately reflect his most
recent position on the scope of this exception. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Harlan rejected linking the fundamental fairness exception to
factual innocence); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95, § 25.7, at 1022 ("In defining the
second exception, Justice Harlan disagreed with himself; the Teague plurality (favoring
Harlan's earlier view) disagreed with the concurring Justices (endorsing Harlan's later
view); and the post-Teague majority (fusing both Harlan views) disagreed with all prior
views."); Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1096 (questioning Teague's fidelity to Harlan's view
of the second exception).
111. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
112. Id. The rule of Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), holding that the exclusion of
all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal defendant's
right to testify on his behalf, is just such a rule. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Prior to Rock,
there was a "strong majority rule" among lower courts to exclude hypnotically refreshed
testimony; thus, Rock is a "classic example" of a "new" rule. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ,
supra note 95, § 25.5 n.12.
113. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
114. See id. at 315-16.
115. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000) (requiring a sentencing enhancement for the use of a
firearm in relation to a drug crime).
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dismissed.118 While the appeal of the dismissal was pending, the
Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States,119 in which the Court
reinterpreted the firearms statute to require the government to show
"active employment of the firearm."'20 The Court in Bousley held
that the Teague analysis was inapplicable to the petitioner's Bailey
claim because Teague addressed only procedural rules, not
substantive constructions of federal statutes.2 ' The Court reasoned
that retroactivity was required because a substantive construction of a
federal statute holding that certain conduct is not punishable carries a
"significant risk" that defendants would be incarcerated for conduct
which is not criminal.
1 22
Second, the Teague Court failed to address whether the analysis
in Teague applies to federal prisoners' petitions filed under § 2255.123
Despite the Court's failure to specifically address this issue and the
existence of a number of significant distinctions between § 2255
proceedings and federal habeas corpus for state prisoners,'24 the lower
courts uniformly have held that the Teague analysis applies to federal
prisoners' § 2255 claims.
25
118. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 617.
119. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
120. Id. at 144.
121. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620; see also 28 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 672.06[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1997) (reviewing pre- and post-Teague cases where
the lower courts had relied on Davis to govern the retroactivity of decisions reinterpreting
federal statutes). While the courts of appeals had routinely applied Supreme Court
decisions interpreting substantive federal criminal statutes retroactively, the lower courts
had employed differing rationales for doing so. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95,
§ 25.1 n.20 (citing cases holding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), retroactive
and noting that some lower courts had not applied the Teague analysis at all while others
had applied Teague and found that a decision interpreting a statute is subject to the first
Teague exception).
122. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620-21.
123. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 327 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[tihe plurality does not address the question whether the rule it announces today
extends to [§ 2255] claims brought by federal, as well as state, prisoners").
124. See infra Part II.C.
125. See, e.g., Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
the Teague doctrine applies in § 2255 proceedings); United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425,
429 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). In Van Daalwyk v. United States, 21 F.3d 179 (7th Cir.
1994), the court gave consideration to the claim that the Teague doctrine did not apply in a
§ 2255 proceeding. Id. at 180. But because of the interest in finality, the fact that the only
other alternative analysis was the Linkletter test that had been repudiated, and the court's
reluctance to treat state and federal prisoners differently, the court held that Teague
should apply. Id. at 180-83. Thus, the Teague doctrine can be seen as sort of an analytical
default, rather than a methodology designed for § 2255 proceedings.
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Congress also has had an impact on the scope of Teague by
passing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996126
("AEDPA"), which amended § 2255 to include a one-year statute of
limitations for bringing claims on collateral review. 127  Additionally,
AEDPA requires a petitioner filing a second or successive § 2255
motion to obtain permission from a court of appeals to file a petition
and limits the availability of a § 2255 motion to claims involving new
constitutional rules that have been "made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. ' 128  As will be
discussed in Part II.B, infra,29 these two provisions have had an
impact on the lower courts' treatment of the retroactivity of
Apprendi. The substantive/procedural dichotomy created by the
Bailey/Bousley line of cases, the application of Teague to § 2255
petitioners, and the passage of AEDPA have resulted in an analysis
of a federal prisoner's Apprendi claim that largely obscures the salient
question of whether a particular federal prisoner is unconstitutionally
incarcerated.
II. THE APPRENDI DILEMMA UNDER TEAGUE
Recall that our hypothetical defendant, Bob, is challenging his
enhanced sentence for a violation of the federal drug laws, imposed in
a federal court by a federal judge, under a statute specifically
126. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1220 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000)).
127. AEDPA provides, in pertinent part, that a one-year statute of limitations run[s]
from the latest of-
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (as amended in 1996 by AEDPA).
128. Id. A second or successive § 2255 motion must be certified by the appropriate
court of appeals to contain:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
Id.
129. Infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
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designed to provide a remedy for unconstitutionally long sentences.13°
This scenario repeatedly has played out in the lower federal courts
with confusing results and rationales."'
This Part will discuss three primary reasons why the Teague
inquiry shortchanges a federal prisoner's Apprendi claim in a § 2255
motion. First, the necessity under Teague to classify a "new" rule as
either procedural or substantive has led most lower courts relying on
Teague to hold that Apprendi is a procedural rule not retroactive on
collateral review without regard to the operation of the Apprendi rule
on the substantive construction of the federal drug statute. By not
considering the operation of a given rule prior to the retroactivity
determination, current unconstitutional incarceration results.
Further, this "threshold inquiry" approach prevents the inherent
infirmities of current retroactivity analysis from being revealed and
corrected. 32  Second, the delineation between direct and collateral
130. See § 2255 (stating that relief may be granted when "the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law"); supra notes 20-32 (explaining the significance of drug
quantity under the federal drug law and Apprendi-based challenges brought under
§ 2255).
131. The courts of appeals that have addressed the retroactivity of Apprendi under the
second Teague exception for "fundamental" or "watershed" procedural rules, Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989), have held that Apprendi is not retroactive. See, e.g.,
United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 998-1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi does
not fall within Teague's second exception); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that Apprendi is not a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure). But see
infra note 147 (noting the split in Ninth Circuit district courts on whether Apprendi
constitutes a watershed rule). Several court of appeals judges, however, recognize that the
Apprendi rule created a substantive change in the elements of a violation of § 841. See
United States v. Clark, 260 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from panel's remand to district court to reconsider in light of Apprendi); McCoy v. United
States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring in the result only)
(reasoning that the Teague analysis is inapplicable because the effect of Apprendi was to
make drug quantity an element of a violation of § 841, and, thus, Apprendi has effected a
substantive change in the law). Because decisions effecting substantive changes in federal
law are not analyzed under Teague, see infra Part II.A, the confusion is not about the
correct result under Teague, but whether Teague is applicable at all. Moreover, further
potential confusion may arise because the Supreme Court has implied that decisions that
change the substantive meaning of a federal statute might fall within Teague's first
exception for decisions "placing conduct 'beyond the power of the criminal law-making
power to proscribe.' " Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (quoting Teague,
489 U.S. at 311).
132. See Branigin, supra note 94, at 1152-53. Professor Branigin identifies two related
difficulties with trying to identify whether a rule is new and then focusing on the
procedural posture to determine whether a litigant should get the benefit of the rule. See
id. First, the determination of whether a rule is truly new, or a "necessary corollary" of an
old rule, is often unclear. Id. Second, the Teague order of analysis allows dismissal of
claims that could implicate fundamental fairness without an inquiry into the merits of a
claim. See id.
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review actually has the effect of treating similarly situated claimants
dissimilarly; this inequality is in turn exacerbated by the AEDPA
amendments to § 2255.33 Third, the policy concerns behind the
Teague plurality opinion are not necessarily applicable to a § 2255
motion, and thus it is even questionable whether the Teague analysis
should govern § 2255 petitions. This Comment will demonstrate the
shortcomings of current retroactivity doctrine as applied to a claim
for relief from an unconstitutional sentence enhancement.
A. Is Apprendi Procedural or Substantive?: The Teague Threshold
Test
The Supreme Court has held that the Teague analysis is only
applicable to new procedural rules134 when the benefit of those new
rules is sought by a petitioner whose conviction has become final
prior to the announcement of the new rule. 135  Furthermore, a
plurality of four endorsed the proposition that the question of
retroactivity should be addressed before a court addresses the merits
of a petitioner's claim.'36 Accordingly, to undertake even this first
step of retroactivity analysis, a court must determine two distinct
issues-whether the rule sought to be applied is in fact new and
whether the rule is procedural or substantive.'37 While these two
inquiries may seem relatively straightforward, they have proven
anything but simple under Teague. In the years since the Teague
plurality defined a "new" rule as one that "breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government,"
or that was not "dictated by precedent,' 38 the Court, attempting to
clarify the meaning of a "new" rule, has broadened the definition
such that almost any application or extension of a legal principle to a
133. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
135. Under current retroactivity analysis, a reviewing court must take the following
steps: First, the court must determine the date the petitioner's conviction became final;
second, the court must determine whether, under the law at that time, a court "would have
felt compelled" to find that the rule was "required" by the Constitution. Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (citing Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 468 (1993); Saffle
v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).
136. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989); see also supra notes 100-04 and
accompanying text (discussing the Teague order-of-decision analysis).
137. See United States v. Clark, 260 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Teague is
inapplicable unless we find both that the rule is new and that it involves a procedural
rather than a substantive change.").
138. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing
Teague's definition of a "new" rule).
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new set of facts constitutes the announcement of a new rule.139 Not
surprisingly, under the definition of a new rule as one that "imposes a
new obligation on ... the Federal Government,' 140 most courts have
held that Apprendi is a new rule.'4'
The next difficulty with the current retroactivity doctrine is the
necessity of classifying a new rule as either procedural or substantive.
Under current law, if a new rule works a substantive change in a
federal criminal statute, the rule is retroactive to cases on collateral
review.142  If the rule is classified as procedural, it is subject to the
Teague inquiry. 14 The difficulty here results from the classification of
the Apprendi rule by reference to the superficial language of the rule
itself rather than by way of an inquiry into the operation of the rule
on the construction of the federal drug statute where a federal drug
prisoner's sentence has been enhanced under § 841(b)(1)(A) or(B). 14
139. In three 1990 cases, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990), Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 488 (1990), and Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990), the Court settled on
a broad formulation of the new rule principle that "validates reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to
be contrary to later decisions." Butler, 494 U.S. at 414. In Butler, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that a decision announces a new rule if the outcome "was susceptible to debate
among reasonable minds," despite the fact that the Court had previously characterized the
rule at issue in Butler as "controlled" by precedent. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 415; see also
Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague
v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371, 399-402 (1991) (arguing that the Court has "provide[dJ
substantial guidance... by broadening the definition of novelty so that virtually every rule
becomes 'new' "). There has been extensive treatment and criticism of the Court's "new
rule" jurisprudence. See generally Arkin, supra, at 399-402 (discussing the Court's new
rule cases); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1747-49, 1791-97 (1991) (analyzing the
Court's "new" rule jurisprudence and proposing a retroactivity analysis drawn from the
law of remedies); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 994-1000
(1991) (discussing how new rule jurisprudence departs from Harlan's view of what
constitutes a new rule). These commentaries demonstrate that "in the area of criminal law
and procedure, the recurrent effort to identify 'new' law with that which is made, not
found, leads to unhelpful debates and conceptual confusions." Fallon & Meltzer, supra, at
1736.
140. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
141. See United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 998 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1266
(10th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Pittman, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (D. Or. 2000).
142. See supra notes 115-22 (discussing retroactivity of substantive statutory
construction decisions).
143. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) ("Teague by its terms
applies only to procedural rules ....").
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (2000) (setting out a life maximum for a first offense
for specified quantities of certain drugs); Id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (setting out a forty-year
maximum for a first offense based on specified quantities of certain drugs); see also
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Relying on Justice Stevens's statement in Apprendi that "[tihe
substantive basis is ... not at issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's
procedure is,'"145 some courts summarily have concluded that the
Apprendi rule is procedural. 146  Still other courts have completely
neglected any inquiry into the nature of the rule and proceeded
directly to whether the Apprendi rule falls within the exceptions to
non-retroactivity announced in Teague.147  Yet other courts have
engaged in a more thoughtful inquiry into the nature of the Apprendi
rule and have concluded that the rule has both procedural and
substantive aspects. For example, in a dissenting opinion in United
States v. Clark,148 Judge Parker set out a thorough analysis of whether
the Apprendi rule was procedural or substantive,' 49 and this reasoning
was later adopted by a district court in Rosario v. United States.150
McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1272 & nn.21, 22 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J.,
concurring in result only). Judge Barkett explained:
The real issue in determining whether Teague applies here is the effect of the
Supreme Court's rejection of New Jersey's procedure on § 841 cases. If, after
Apprendi, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum is an element of the charged offense rather than a mere
sentencing factor, then drug quantity is now an element of an offense leading to a
punishment in excess of twenty years pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B).
Id. at 1272 (Barkett, J., concurring in result only) (internal citation omitted).
145. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000).
146. See Sanders, 247 F.3d at 147 (relying on Justice Stevens's statement to conclude
that "Apprendi constitutes a procedural rule because it dictates what fact-finding
procedure must be employed to ensure a fair trial.").
147. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Apprendi
is not a watershed rule under the second Teague exception "insofar as it effects
discrepancies between an information and jury instructions"). The Jones holding was
limited to whether Apprendi applied retroactively to a state murder statute. District
courts in the Ninth Circuit have divided on whether Apprendi applies retroactively in
other contexts. Compare Reynolds v. Cambra, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(holding that Apprendi constitutes a " 'watershed rule' essential to the fundamental
fairness of a criminal proceeding" and applying the rule retroactively to a state conviction
where the sentence was enhanced because of a firearms violation), with Panoke v. United
States, No. Civ. 00-00548, 2001 WL 46941, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 5, 2001) (finding that the
Apprendi rule is not a "watershed rule" requiring retroactive application to a § 2255
motion attacking a drug and firearms conviction). Although the court in Jones had
applied an analysis similar to the proposed extended decision-time model, i.e., considering
the operation of a new rule in a given context, the Panoke court specifically rejected this
approach, stating that "[r]etroactivity of a new constitutional rule should not vary with the
merits or facts of each case, therefore the logical extension of Jones is to not apply
Apprendi retroactively on collateral review regardless of the type of Apprendi violation
alleged." Id.
148. 260 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2001).
149. See id. at 385-88 (Parker, J., dissenting).
150. No. 00 Civ. 9695, 2001 WL 1006641, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 30, 2001) ("The Court is
persuaded by the rationale of the dissent in [Clark] which distinguishes between the new,
substantive aspects of Apprendi and the ancient procedural ones.").
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Judge Parker reasoned that if Apprendi were read as holding that
every element of a crime must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the rule was procedural and subject to
the Teague analysis.151 On the other hand, Judge Parker wrote, if the
Apprendi rule were read as redefining the elements of a federal
offense, i.e., adding drug quantity as an element of an offense under
§ 841, then Apprendi was a substantive decision and could be asserted
in a § 2255 motion.152  Because prior Fifth Circuit cases had
interpreted Apprendi as a rule that redefined the elements of a drug
offense under federal law, the rule should be treated as a substantive
rule.'53 Accordingly, Judge Parker concluded that Apprendi should
be retroactive to cases on collateral review.'54
The Clark case highlights the confusion that results from
engaging in a threshold categorization of a rule as "new,"
"procedural," or "substantive" before considering how the rule
operates on the merits of a case. If Apprendi simply requires all the
elements of a crime to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is procedural. Moreover, there is nothing particularly new about
151. Clark, 260 F.3d at 385 (Parker, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker concluded that if Apprendi were a
substantive decision, the case would be governed by Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,
346-47 (1974) (holding that a defendant may assert in a § 2255 proceeding a claim based
on an intervening substantive change in the interpretation of a federal criminal statute).
153. Clark, 260 F.3d at 385-86 (Parker, J., dissenting). Prior to Clark, the Fifth Circuit
had held that Apprendi's significance for the penalty provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) was
that it made drug quantity an element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor. See
Burton v. United States, 237 F.3d 490, 490-91 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1177
(2001); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1177 (2001); see also United States v. Hernandez, 137 F. Supp. 2d 919, 928 (N.D. Ohio
2001) ("Apprendi's holding encompasses a substantive construction, based on
constitutional law, of any statute that treats facts that increase the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum as a sentencing factor rather than as an element
of the crime.").
154. See Clark, 260 F.3d at 388 (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker reasoned that the
nature of an Apprendi claim in the context of a § 841 drug offense is that while a
defendant is guilty of possessing an unspecified quantity of drugs, he is actually innocent
of possessing the quantity necessary to support an enhanced sentence under § 841(b). See
id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000), which sets a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment and a mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment); see also United
States v. Pittman, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 n.9 (D. Or. 2000) (holding that "a defendant
may be 'actually innocent' of a sentencing enhancement while guilty of the underlying
offense"). Agreeing with Judge Parker, Judge Barkett, in the Eleventh Circuit, further
reasoned that despite the procedural component of Apprendi, i.e., shifting fact-finding
from judge to jury and changing the burden of proof, a petitioner's Apprendi claim should
not be analyzed under Teague as long as the petitioner's claim "relies on Apprendi's effect
on substantive law, as it does in the context of § 841." McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d
1245, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring in result only).
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such a rule even under the Court's broad definition of a "new" rule.
But in the context of an enhanced sentence under § 841, if the
operative effect of the Apprendi rule is to define drug quantity as a
brand new element of the offense, the rule is a substantive
construction of a federal criminal law. On this view, Apprendi is an
old procedural rule that has, in operation, created a new element of a
substantive criminal offense. Current retroactivity doctrine does not
provide a clear analysis where such a hybrid rule of constitutional law
has been announced. Rather, the Teague and Bousley cases rely on
the neat categorization of rules as "new," "procedural," or
"substantive,"155 determinations not easily made without looking at
the rule's operative effect in a given context.
B. How Current Retroactivity Doctrine and AEDPA Treat Similarly
Situated Litigants Dissimilarly
Concerned with "evenhanded justice," the Teague plurality
concluded that the principle of treating similarly situated litigants
similarly required a bright line to be drawn between direct and
collateral review.156 On closer inspection, however, it is not at all
clear that the Teague analysis promotes fairness in the way that the
plurality suggested. Further, in the context of Apprendi, the current
retroactivity analysis and the adoption of AEDPA57 only exacerbate
the disparate treatment of defendants who are similarly situated.
By adopting a bright-line distinction between direct and
collateral review, the Teague plurality misconceived the definition of
"similarly situated." The plurality defined those "similarly situated"
as litigants in the same procedural posture, rather than litigants
advancing the same fundamental claim. 58 As Professor Patchel
notes, pre-Teague retroactivity doctrine focused on the nature of the
right involved in the claim.159 Citing the positions of Justices Black
155. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (holding that Teague only
applies to procedural rules and noting that "[t]his distinction between substance and
procedure is an important one in the habeas context"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301
(1989) (noting that "[i]t is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a
new rule").
156. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300, 305 (discussing the inequity that resulted from
applying the Linkletter test to "similarly situated defendants on collateral review").
157. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
158. As commentators have noted, "[A] formalistic argument [that focuses on the
procedural posture of a case] ignores the reality that the entire class of convicted prisoners
is 'similarly situated' when it comes to the prisoners' shared interest in avoiding
incarceration that offends the Constitution." LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95, § 25.2
n.45.
159. Patchel, supra note 139, at 1003.
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and Douglas in the early years of the Court's retroactivity doctrine,16°
Professor Patchel argues that Justices Douglas and Black defined
"similarly situated" prisoners as those with the same type of claim,
rather than those in the same procedural posture. 161  Rather than
remedying any inequality inherent in the Court's early retroactivity
approach,162 the Teague plurality's approach "merely shifts the
lines.
163
Professor Patchel's argument has substantial force in the
Apprendi context. Assume our two defendants, Bob and Fred, were
separately tried co-conspirators who were both convicted in the
Fourth Circuit under § 841(a)(1). 164 Both received enhanced
sentences based on drug quantity pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A).165
Different results obtain depending upon how quickly each case was
decided on direct appeal. If Bob's direct appeal was settled before
the announcement of the Apprendi rule, he will not be able to benefit
from the rule and will not be resentenced. On the other hand, Fred,
whose direct appeal took longer, could receive the benefit of the
Apprendi rule and be resentenced if his direct appeal was still
pending when Apprendi was decided. This inequity results despite
the fact that both Fred and Bob have the same claim, were subject to
the same practice of having judges find drug quantity on a
preponderance of the evidence, and, moreover, took part in the same
conspiracy at the same time in the same circuit. 66
160. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 714 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that it is incomprehensible that the "fortuitous circumstances" of the
time of the alleged wrong should compel unequal treatment of litigants with the same type
of claim); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255-56 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It
still remains a mystery how some convicted people are given new trials for
unconstitutional convictions and others are kept in jail without any hope of relief though
their complaints are equally meritorious."); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 304 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]o deny this petitioner and others like him the benefit of the
new rule deprives them of a constitutional trial and perpetrates a rank discrimination
against them.").
161. Patchel,supra note 139, at 1003.
162. See supra Part I (discussing early retroactivity doctrine and selective
prospectivity).
163. Patchel, supra note 139, at 1004.
164. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
165. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A); see supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (explaining the
penalty structure of § 841).
166. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that Apprendi does not
apply to a federal drug prisoner's § 2255 motion, but does apply to a similar claim on
direct review. Compare United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Apprendi does not apply to § 2255 motions), with United States v. Angle, 230
F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that Apprendi requires that defendant on direct
review be resentenced to a maximum of twenty years).
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A further inequity results due to the amendments AEDPA made
to § 2255.167 Under the current version of § 2255, the one-year statute
of limitations for filing a motion runs from, among other dates, "the
date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court ... and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review. 1' 68  In contrast, a second and successive petition
based on an intervening change in law cannot be raised unless it is
based on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable. 1 69  In Tyler v. Cain,' the Court held that for the
purposes of a second or successive petition, the language in § 2255
requires that the Supreme Court specifically hold that a rule is
retroactive.' No such limitation exists, however, for initial § 2255
petitions.112 This discrepancy in statutory language has led a number
of lower courts to conclude that, at least for initial petitions, those
courts may make the retroactivity determination for new
constitutional rules.'73 Thus, under the current retroactivity doctrine
and the current construction of the language of § 2255, if Bob and
Fred are both on collateral review in the same circuit, they may be
treated dissimilarly. If Bob raises his Apprendi challenge in his first
§ 2255 motion, he may receive the benefit of the rule; but if Fred,
having already filed one § 2255 motion before Apprendi was decided,
attempts to raise the same claim, he will be barred under Tyler. The
Supreme Court's Tyler decision simply forecloses the possibility that
a second or successive § 2255 motion will be entertained without a
Supreme Court holding of retroactivity. Thus, even the Teague
167. See supra notes 127-28 (setting forth the statute of limitations in the amended
version of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000)).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (as amended by AEDPA).
169. Id. (as amended by AEDPA) (emphasis added).
170. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
171. See id. at 662-63 (interpreting the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), which is
identical to the language in § 2255, and holding that a new rule is not made retroactive for
purposes of a second or successive petition unless the Court specifically holds that it is
retroactive).
172. See § 2255 (stating that the one year statute of limitations runs from the date that
a new right is recognized by the Supreme Court but not explicitly limiting the retroactivity
determination to the Supreme Court).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 248 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[Section]
2255(3) does not require that the retroactivity determination must be made by the
Supreme Court itself."). The Eighth Circuit has also recognized the possibility that a
lower court may hold Apprendi retroactive if the issue is raised in an initial § 2255 motion.
United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (resolving the issue in favor of
non-retroactivity).
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bright-line definition of "similarly situated," meaning all litigants in
the same procedural posture, does not operate evenly.
When two petitioners with the same claim in the same
procedural posture are treated inequitably, the argument that the
procedural posture of a case alone constitutes a principled definition
of "similarly situated" for purposes of applying a new constitutional
rule does not ring true. This inequity demonstrates, at the very least,
that the rationale behind Teague of treating similarly situated litigants
similarly is arguably not advanced by focusing on the procedural
posture of the case; in conjunction with the provisions of AEDPA,
that rationale is further undercut because even litigants in the same
procedural posture may be treated dissimilarly.
A comment is warranted here about the effect of ambiguous
language found in the one-year statute of limitations that was added
to § 2255 by AEDPA.174 As noted above, some courts have read the
language in the statute of limitations to allow those courts to make
the retroactivity determination in the case of an initial § 2255
petition.175 At the same time, those courts also have read the one-
year statute of limitations in § 2255 as running from the date
Apprendi was announced.176 Thus, in United States v. Clark,'77 Judge
Parker, after concluding that Apprendi was retroactive, reasoned that
even if the Fifth Circuit held that the Apprendi rule was retroactive to
Clark's § 2255 claim, other petitioners would be barred from raising
their Apprendi claims because the statute of limitations had run.178
This inequity apparently would result even if the retroactivity
determination was made in a case announced after the one-year
limitations period had run. Judge Parker failed to fully explain why
this result would be a correct and principled one, and this conclusion,
while clever, is somewhat heartless. Imagine that both Bob and Fred
have filed the same claim in an initial § 2255 petition within one year
of a new constitutional rule affecting sentencing. If a court avoids
making a retroactivity determination until after the time limitation
has run, and disposes of Fred's case on other grounds, Fred cannot
file a second § 2255 motion raising that claim unless the Supreme
174. See supra notes 127-28.
175. See cases cited supra note 173.
176. See United States v. Clark, 260 F.3d 382, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J.,
dissenting); Lopez, 248 F.3d at 432-33. The language in § 2255 is ambiguous on the
question of who determines retroactivity, and on when the statute begins to run. See
§ 2255; infra note 181.
177. 260 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2001).
178. Id. at 388-89 (Parker, J., dissenting).
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Court has held the rule to be retroactive.'79 If, after the limitations
period has run, the court does decide, in Bob's case, that the new rule
is retroactive to his initial § 2255 petition, Bob will get the benefit of
the rule, but no other litigants will. Thus, that court has, in effect,
engaged in "selective retroactivity." Because Bob is the petitioner in
the case announcing retroactivity, he would get the benefit of a new
rule while Fred, with the same claim filed at the same time, and in the
same procedural posture, would not. This is the mirror image of the
"selective prospectivity" problem that prompted the Court to adopt
Justice Harlan's view and discredit the practice of "[s]imply fishing
one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that
new rule."1' s
Whether Judge Parker correctly interpreted the statute of
limitations is arguable. t8' The possibility that the statute of
limitations might operate this way, however, only raises more
questions about the wisdom of applying complicated retroactivity
analysis that has the potential to produce uneven results.
C. The Nature of a § 2255 Motion: Policy and Retroactivity
In contrast with the federal habeas corpus remedy for state
prisoners,"82 § 2255 has unique characteristics that suggest that a
§ 2255 motion is "an integral part of a continuous criminal
proceeding,' 1 83  rather than a separate civil action. 8" This
179. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).
180. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
181. The Lopez court noted that the circuits were split on when the statute of
limitations begins to run. Lopez, 248 F.3d at 432-33. The court rejected the possibility
that the statute of limitations is triggered when a lower court makes the retroactivity
determination on an initial § 2255 motion. Id. at 433. The Ninth Circuit considered this
possibility in United States v. Valdez, 195 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1999), holding that a
petitioner's Bailey claim was not time-barred because the statute of limitations in
§ 2255(3) ran from the date the Supreme Court held Bailey retroactive in Bousley, not
from the date of the Bailey decision. See id. at 547-48. That court noted that "§ 2255(3)
does not specify whether the Supreme Court itself must have declared the right
retroactive, or whether it is enough that this court have done so." See id. at 548 n.7.
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
183. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95, § 25.6, at 1014.
184. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 362 n.4 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating
that § 2255 is a "further step in [a] criminal case, not ... separate civil action"); Grady v.
United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding certain claims not cognizable in a
§ 2255 motion because it is a "further step" in the criminal case and not a separate civil
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interpretation, in turn, raises the possibility that the Teague doctrine
does not apply to § 2255 proceedings because they are not collateral
proceedings. Though most courts and commentators reject this
possibility,'85 there are several significant characteristics of an
Apprendi claim raised in a § 2255 motion that call into doubt whether
the policy concerns underlying the Teague doctrine exist in the
federal prisoner context. Policy concerns often expressed for limiting
the retroactivity of new constitutional rules are federal-state relations,
finality, and deterrence. 18 6  An analysis of these justifications with
respect to a federal drug prisoner's Apprendi claim reveals that the
Teague doctrine may not be the most appropriate vehicle for
determining retroactivity of new constitutional sentencing rules in the
federal context.
1. The Interest in Comity
First, the Teague plurality suggested that the retroactivity
doctrine serves the interests of the states, not the federal
government.187 Relying on Professor Mishkin's observation that the
potential availability of the Mapp exclusionary rule is "what created
the retroactivity problem of Linkletter in the first place," the plurality
went on to stress that because collateral review continually forces the
states to expend resources to answer prisoners' claims of
constitutional error when the convictions at issue complied with then
prevailing constitutional law, the costs of retroactivity outweighed the
benefits of retroactive application of new rules. 8  The Court
explained that state courts are "understandably frustrated" when,
having applied existing constitutional law, a federal court injects error
into past state court proceedings by applying a new constitutional rule
in a collateral federal proceeding.189
action); S. REP. No. 80-1526, at 2 (1948) (characterizing a § 2255 motion as being "in" the
criminal proceeding).
185. See, e.g., Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding the
Teague doctrine applicable to § 2255 motions); United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429
n.8 (D.C. Cir 1990) (holding Teague applicable to § 2255 motions); see also Arkin, supra
note 139, at 395 (noting that lower federal courts have been untroubled by the distinctions
between collateral review of state and federal convictions and arguing that Teague's
application to § 2255 claims could be classified as a "predictable non-issue"). But see
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 327 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that whether
Teague applies to a § 2255 motion is an open question).
186. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) ("[O]ur new rule
jurisprudence" serves "interests in finality, predictability, and comity.").




APPRENDI AND COLLATERAL REVIEW
Our hypothetical drug prisoner, Bob, has raised an Apprendi
claim asserting that his sentence for a federal drug crime is
unconstitutional because a federal judge found drug quantity as a fact
at his sentencing hearing on a preponderance of the evidence. In a
§ 2255 motion, a federal court does not review a state court judgment
or state-imposed sentence. Thus, there is simply no federalism issue
in this context, and whatever policy justification may support non-
retroactivity when a federal court is reviewing a state court judgment
is inapplicable to Bob's case. Assuming the interest to be served is
respect for any lower court judgment, however, and further conceding
that the interest is valid, the adjudicatory value of weighing that
interest in the § 2255 context is questionable. A lower federal court's
consideration of this interest suggests that there is some meaningful
way to accurately balance Bob's interest in vindicating a
constitutional right on one hand, and a lower federal court's interest
in having its constitutional interpretations validated, on the other.9
As discussed in the next section, placing importance on this interest is
also inappropriate in the § 2255 sentencing claim context because the
judge reviewing the constitutionality of a sentence is the very same
judge that originally sentenced the defendant.
2. The Interest in Deterrence
Another factor the Teague plurality considered was the
deterrence function of collateral review.19" ' When federal courts
review a state court determination of federal rights, the federal courts
ensure compliance with the Federal Constitution. In the federal
criminal context, the value of deterrence is served by having a higher
federal court review the constitutional adjudication of a lower federal
court for correctness.'9 2 Relying on Justice Harlan's Desist dissent,
the Teague plurality agreed that because one of the functions of
habeas is to serve as an incentive for trial and appellate courts to
190. See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247, 269-70 & n.93
(1988) (arguing that balancing the liberty interest of a prisoner against a state's interest in
its procedures necessarily creates the "intractable difficulties" associated with balancing
"apples and oranges").
191. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306.
192. It was precisely this "appellate" view of habeas corpus to which Justice Harlan
was referring in his Mackey opinion:
The primary justification given by the Court for extending the scope of habeas to
all alleged constitutional errors [and applying the law at the time of the petition]
is that it provides a quasi-appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional mark.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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conduct their proceedings according to "established constitutional
standards," this function can be served adequately if a habeas court
applies the constitutional rules in effect at the time of the original
proceedings. 93
The deterrence interest, however, is arguably not served when
Bob and Fred bring their § 2255 Apprendi claims. In contrast to the
habeas petitioner who is challenging a state conviction in a federal
court, Bob and Fred will file their motions in "the court which
imposed the sentence.' 19 4 Moreover, under the rules governing the
district courts, the motion "shall be presented promptly to the judge
of the district court who presided at the movant's trial and sentenced
him."'19 5 Thus, the sentencing judge is often the same person ruling on
the § 2255 petition challenging that sentence with an Apprendi claim.
As some scholars have noted, "[t]he possibility of bias inherent in
allowing judges whose rulings are under attack to review § 2255
motions has led to criticism of the same-judge assignment rule.' 19 6
Thus, where a judge is reviewing his own prior sentencing
determination, it makes little sense to rely on the notion that
collateral review serves as a necessary additional incentive to adhere
to constitutional standards. Obviously, the federal judge believed
that his decision was correct when he rendered the decision.
Similarly, the current retroactivity doctrine presents a problem
for federal judges considering Apprendi claims in § 2255 motions.
First, under Teague's proclamation that only "old" rules, those
"dictated by precedent,' 1 97 generally will be retroactive, a federal
judge applying Apprendi retroactively would be required to find that
his prior sentencing decision was based on a misreading of precedent
so severe that the error could not even be reasonably susceptible to
debate.'98 Second, because current retroactivity is based on a
193. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
195. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS, R. 4(a) (2001); see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95, § 41.4c, at 1592
n.39 (quoting the RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS, R. 4(a) advisory committee note as recognizing the
" 'longstanding majority practice [of] assigning motions made pursuant to § 2255 [to] the
trial judge' ").
196. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 95, § 41.4c, at 1592.
197. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
198. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 378 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("When
determining whether a rule is new .... [w]e ask only whether the result was dictated by
past cases, or whether it is 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.' ") (citations
omitted) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)).
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theoretical construct that injects error into prior proceedings,19 9 the
federal judge must then not only correct the prior judgment, but
candidly admit that her prior decision was in error. The model
proposed in Part III provides a simpler way to' approach these
problems.
3. The Interest in Finality
The most significant policy behind the restrictions on applying
new constitutional rules to collateral review, and arguably the most
legitimate, is the value of finality. Finality serves society's interest in
the certainty that once a conviction of guilt has been rendered under
constitutionally fair procedures, that verdict will be left untouched.
Finality also preserves judicial resources.20 After reviewing the
Court's reliance on the value of finality in civil cases, the plurality in
Teague noted, "The fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal
prosecutions 'shows only that "conventional notions of finality"
should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not
that they should have none.' "201 The importance of finality also
serves the development of constitutional law by reducing the costs of
announcing new rules: If a new rule of constitutional law will not
apply to a conviction once it has been determined to be final, the cost
to society of freeing prisoners who have been found guilty of an
offense is reduced.
202
The Teague Court implied that the development of the analysis
announced in that case was driven not so much by concern over
theoretical clarity, but by a desire to restrict the scope of collateral
review ostensibly to serve the interest in finality.2 °3  That the
199. See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text (discussing the transaction-time
model of current retroactivity doctrine).
200. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (setting forth Justice Harlan's two-
prong finality justification).
201. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142,150 (1970)).
202. See Haddad, supra note 40, at 424 (noting that a retroactive application of Mapp
would call into question the continued incarceration of prisoners whose convictions of
guilt were not in doubt); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98 (1999) (discussing the "cost of change" and noting that "the
Supreme Court would never have required Miranda warnings if doing so meant that every
confessed criminal then in custody had to be set free").
203. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10. The Teague Court relied, in part, on Professor
Mishkin's description of the Linkletter retroactivity problem as not one of whether a rule
would be retroactively available on collateral review, but whether collateral review should
be available at all to" 'go behind the otherwise final judgment of conviction.' " Id. at 310
(quoting Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77-78 (1965)).
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development of the current retroactivity doctrine is driven primarily
by social and political concerns is well supported by scholarly
literature. °4  Some commentators have noted that the Teague
doctrine, fueled by the desire to restrict collateral review, only further
complicated retroactivity theory without solving the retroactivity
problem. The Court has been criticized for muddying the
retroactivity waters rather than directly restricting the scope of
collateral review when its recent decisions suggested that restrictions
on the availability of collateral review were, and are, the real goal.2"6
Other commentators argue that basing the retroactivity doctrine on
policy concerns of finality has resulted in a loss of principled
adjudication.207 Still others note that the current debate over the
availability of collateral review depends on subjective factors,2 8 which
raises the question of whether the Court should even be engaged in
what is, at bottom, a political debate best solved by the legislature.
However valid these criticisms may be, it is true that on some level,
finality of judgments is a necessary component to a functioning
criminal justice system. This Comment will argue, however, that this
interest can be served under a model of retroactivity that provides
more theoretical clarity than the Teague analysis.20 9
III. THE EXTENDED DECISION-TIME MODEL
In a recent article,210 Professor Kermit Roosevelt exhaustively
canvassed the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine and proposed a
204. See generally sources cited supra note 94 (noting commentary on Teague).
205. Professor Roosevelt characterizes the Teague doctrine as "symptomatic of a larger
mistake." Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1113. Instead of realizing the problem with
retroactivity theory, Roosevelt argues, "[B]oth the Court and commentators have
persistently seen habeas, rather than retroactivity, as the source of the problem. They
have thus responded by tinkering with habeas .. " Id. at 1113.
206. James B. Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court Retroactivity
Analysis: An Inadequate Surrogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas
Corpus, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1062, 1076-79 (1984) (arguing that "[i]f the Supreme Court's
real desire is [the restriction of collateral review,] it could take the direct approach of
narrowing the grounds for [collateral review]").
207. Patchel, supra note 139, at 1028-46 (concluding that the Court's "lack of concern
for the interests of petitioners" is evidence that the Court's concern is not principled
decision-making, but the jurisdictional reach of the habeas statutes).
208. Rosenberg, supra note 94, at 375 (arguing that an individual's view on whether
habeas corpus is an unwarranted interference with the ability of the criminal justice system
to keep guilty persons in jail or is a mechanism for safeguarding individual constitutional
rights is "profoundly shaped by personal concerns about crime and about civil liberties").
209. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the interest in finality under the extended
decision-time model).
210. See Roosevelt, supra note 9.
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new model of retroactivity, called the "decision-time" model.21'
Relying heavily on Professor Roosevelt's insightful analysis, this
Comment argues that the decision-time model should be extended to
apply to cases on federal collateral review when a new rule of
constitutional law affecting sentencing is at issue.
A. Professor Roosevelt's Decision- Time Model
The question of retroactivity is largely a choice of law question;
in a given case, what law applies? Professor Kermit Roosevelt
contends that the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine is
problematic because the Court developed it within a transaction-time
model.212 The premise of the Linkletter era decisions was that parties
should be governed by the law in effect at the time of the conduct-
i.e., the transaction-at issue in a case.213 Thus, if the Court desired to
make a law retroactive, the law-changing decision had to "reach back
in time to change what the law was. "214
In contrast to a model that changes the law in the past, Professor
Roosevelt proposed a model of retroactivity termed the "decision-
time" model:
Where the transaction-time model supposes that the legally
relevant rights and duties are those existing at the time of
the parties' actions, the decision-time model starts from the
opposite premise. Courts should apply their current best
understanding of the law to all cases before them, regardless
of whether the best understanding at the time of the
transaction would produce a different result.
A Court confronted with a "retroactivity question" thus has
no choice in what law to apply if it is using the decision-time
model. Current law governs, and the authority of a law-
changing decision cannot be denied.
215
Therefore, Professor Roosevelt explains, the decision-time model
produces retroactive effect not by reaching back into the past to
change what the law was at the time of the parties' conduct, but by
simply applying current law.216
211. See id. at 1117-31.
212. Id. at 1110-15.
213. Id. at 1078-79.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1117-18.
216. Id. at 1124-25 ("Decision-time law is applied without retroactively changing
transaction-time law, for the simple reason that only decision-time law is relevant.").
2003] 1255
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Under the current transaction-time framework, when the Court
announces a new rule in a case on direct review and applies that
decision to the appellant in that case, the Court, in effect, reaches
back in time to change the law at the time of the claimed
constitutional violation. The effect of handling retroactivity in this
manner is that "[t]he retroactive application of new law injects error
into proceedings that were error-free when conducted." '217 Put
another way, the law does not change at the time of the decision, but
by virtue of the application of the new rule in the case, the law
changes retroactively at the time of the complained of constitutional
violation.
Therefore, under a theoretically pure transaction-time
framework, a petitioner whose claim arose any time after the date of
the original violation that the Court addressed in the law-changing
decision should benefit from the rule announced in that case.21
Moreover, this would be true regardless of whether the petitioner
seeks direct or collateral review; as long as the petitioner's claim
arose after the law changed-i.e., after the date of the original
transaction-the procedural posture of the case is irrelevant.219 As
noted above in the discussion of the development of the retroactivity
doctrine, this is not the course the Court has taken.22 Thus, the
theoretical confusion arises from the Court's adherence to an impure
transaction-time model that imposes an arbitrary temporal line based
on the procedural posture of a case that has nothing to do with the
point at which the transaction-time model dictates the law actually
changed.'
Professor Roosevelt argues that the decision-time model clarifies
this conceptual problem because it contains a self-executing
delineation between cases on direct review and cases on collateral
review.222 Professor Roosevelt's premise is that the purpose of
collateral review is not to apply the current best understanding of the
217. Id. at 1081.
218. See id. at 1112 & n.198.
219. See id. at 1112 ("The single retroactive application has also changed the law
applicable to cases already finally decided .... Without a distinction between old law and
new law ... there is no way to avoid judging collateral attacks according to the new law,
for the holding of retroactivity has made it the old law.").
220. See supra Part I.
221. See Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1112 (arguing that since the transaction-time
model makes new law applicable to conduct arising after the date of the conduct at issue in
a case, that model cannot distinguish between cases on direct or collateral review).
222. See id. at 1120, 11.21 n.229 (arguing that by preserving the correctness of earlier
decisions, the decision-time model distinguishes between direct and collateral review
because a habeas court need only decide whether a case was "correct when rendered").
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law to a collateral challenge, but to review lower court decisions and
ask whether the judgment was correct at the time it was decided; thus,
decision-time law is not controlling. 223 Despite this view of collateral
review, Professor Roosevelt does acknowledge that even where a
lower judgment may have been correct, certain cases result in
unconstitutional incarcerations, and those cases should be open to
collateral review in the decision-time model.224 It follows, then, that
mere correctness of a judgment cannot alone justify incarceration if
that incarceration is unconstitutional.
B. The Extended Decision-Time Model
Under the decision-time model, reviewing courts considering
direct appeals apply the "current best understanding of the law to all
cases before them. ' 22 This Comment proposes an extended decision-
time model that applies Professor Roosevelt's model to § 2255 claims
based on new constitutional rules affecting the determination of a
petitioner's sentence. On one hand, the extended decision-time
model could be construed as merely reviving the pre-Linkletter
standard of complete retroactive application of all new constitutional
rules. There are, however, two analytical differences under the
proposed extended decision-time model that distinguish it.
First, the extended decision-time model, like the decision-time
model, addresses only the question of what law is available in a § 2255
petition. This is a different question from whether, in any particular
case, a current incarceration is actually working a constitutional
wrong, or what remedy, if any, is required. As Professor Roosevelt
points out, "[t]he demand that courts 'apply the law as it is at the
time, not as it once was,' speaks to the analytical model but does not
require any particular result.
'226
Second, because the premise of the extended decision-time
model is that current law is applied without injecting error into prior
proceedings, only a claim of current unconstitutional incarceration
would require a remedy. As Daniel Meador explains, when a
223. See id. at 1121 ("Habeas is ... a collateral remedy, focusing on the correctness of
the judgment when rendered.").
224. See id. at 1122. Professor Roosevelt presents an argument that "[i]ncarceration
after a change in law might violate the Constitution in two primary ways ... which ...
precisely track the Harlan!Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity on collateral review."
See id. at 1121-24.
225. Id. at 1117.
226. Id. at 1127 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681 (1971) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
2003] 1257
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
petitioner brings a claim on collateral review, the basis of the
petitioner's claimed injury is the "presently continuing confinement
imposed in a manner which violates the Constitution as presently
construed. ' 227 On this view, a § 2255 petitioner would not be entitled
to relief solely by showing that there had been a constitutional
violation in the past. Rather, he would be required to show a
constitutional violation working a current or future constitutional
wrong. In this way, the extended decision-time model is limited to
claims arising from new constitutional rules directly bearing on a
petitioner's sentencing, rather than his adjudication of guilt. The
petitioner's claim is "current" because it stems from the severity of his
current sentence, which is presently continuing, rather than a claim of
past error in the determination of guilt at trial, a past constitutional
error. In essence, a claim under the extended decision-time model is
a claim for prospective relief from the continuation of an
unconstitutionally severe sentence; it is a direct attack on the
sentence, not the past procedures used to impose the sentence. As
conceived here, the extended decision-time model thus avoids the
situation where the announcement of a new rule of constitutional law
affecting trial or pre-trial procedures compels a court to apply that
rule and vacate a prior judgment of guilt,228 the precise situation that
concerned the Linkletter Court.229
The extended decision-time model shares some of the same
properties of constitutional harmless error review, 23° and, indeed,
allows for such review. This model settles the question of which law
227. Daniel J. Meador, Habeas Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REV.
1115, 1117 (1964). Meador explains that under this view, there is a "direct causal link
between [the Constitutional violation] and the present confinement" that transcends any
temporal limitation. See id.
228. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 139, at 1799 (noting Justice Stevens's reference
to harmless error review in his Teague concurrence and arguing that "[w]hen an alleged
constitutional error would be harmless in any event, a court could refrain from
adjudicating the constitutional merits on the ground that any finding of violation would
not lead to relief"). In a collateral attack concerning a rule established in a prior case,
harmless error analysis allows a reviewing court to first determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred and then decide whether any remedy is required. Patchel, supra
note 139, at 1004-05.
229. See Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1091-92 (arguing that, given the "avalanche of
habeas petitions" that would result if the Mapp rule were held to be retroactive, the
Linkletter Court's development of a non-retroactivity analysis "was almost inevitable");
supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
230. "Harmless constitutional error review" can be traced to Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967), in which the Court held that constitutional errors would not require
reversal of a criminal conviction if a reviewing court was convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the result of the case. See id. at
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applies, but the availability and application of a particular new
constitutional rule will not necessarily compel any given result, such
as reversal of a conviction, or even resentencing, in every case. If,
after reviewing the facts of a case, a court determines that the
application of current law would not change the currently continuing
sentence of a federal prisoner, then no remedy is required, despite a
constitutional error in the past. The key conceptual difference,
however, between the extended decision-time model and harmless
constitutional error review lies in the fact that the federal prisoner
bringing a claim in a § 2255 motion does not claim error in prior
proceedings. Rather, the nature of his claim is that under current
constitutional law, his incarceration is effecting a current
constitutional violation. Specifically, in the context of a federal drug
prisoner's Apprendi claim, the claim is that the length of the sentence
is effecting a current and unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.
Under this view, the claim is for prospective relief, rather than an
attack on the adjudication of guilt or initial imposition of a sentence.
As noted above, the extended decision-time model does not
preclude a harmless error analysis. If, for example, a federal prisoner
stipulated to drug quantity at sentencing, a court could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal prisoner's sentence is
correct even applying current law because the fact that the drug
quantity was found by a judge on a preponderance of the evidence in
violation of Apprendi is not working a current constitutional
deprivation. Moreover, the fact that a court must inquire into past
events-i.e., what transpired at a past sentencing hearing-does not
preclude finding both that (1) at the time of sentencing the decision
was legally correct; and (2) the petitioner is nevertheless entitled to
relief on collateral review because his sentence is unconstitutionally
severe, and is thus working a current constitutional wrong.2 1 The
inquiry into past events does not render those past events erroneous,
but merely serves as a factual basis on which a court may grant
prospective relief for a constitutional wrong that is currently in effect
or will take effect in the future-i.e., the day an unconstitutional
sentence enhancement takes effect. As the next section
231. Meador, supra note 227, at 1119. Meador argues that the inquiry into the
circumstances of a past prosecution does not foreclose a remedy on collateral review. See
id. ("Despite the necessary involvement of what happened at a long-ago prosecution, the
theory of habeas corpus makes the question for the court the present constitutionality of
presently continuing detention.") But see Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1121 n.233 (arguing
against Meador's conception of granting relief on collateral review due to an intervening
change in law, but recognizing the viability of harmless error review).
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demonstrates, the application of the extended decision-time model
addresses the three shortcomings of Teague discussed in Part II and
results in a clearer and more uniform application of the Apprendi rule
as applied in the § 2255 context.
IV. HOW THE EXTENDED DECISION-TIME MODEL ADDRESSES THE
TEAGUE SHORTCOMINGS
A. Is Apprendi Procedural or Substantive?: The Extended Decision-
Time Model
Recall that under the Teague analysis, a court must answer two
preliminary questions to adjudicate Bob's § 2255 claim: Whether a
rule is new, and whether the rule is procedural or substantive.232
Under the extended decision-time model, the inquiry into whether a
rule is new or old drops out of the analysis. The Apprendi rule, that
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," '233 is
the current law. Under the extended decision-time model, there is no
need to engage in an inquiry about whether a law is new or old.
Current law is available as a basis of Bob's claim, and a court
proceeds directly to a determination of the operation of the rule on
his claim.
Similarly, under the extended decision-time model, the decision
whether a rule is procedural or substantive will not determine the
availability of the rule to a § 2255 petitioner. The application of the
new rule to a case, however, may reveal the true nature of the rule.
As Judge Parker did in his dissent in United States v. Clark,"' a court
will proceed to examine the operation of the Apprendi rule on Bob's
substantive claim,235 and, as other courts have determined when faced
with Apprendi claims on direct review, will likely conclude that the
Apprendi rule made drug quantity an element of a violation of the
federal drug laws that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to support an enhanced sentence.236 Thus, unless a judge could
conclude that the drug quantity determination was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, Bob would be resentenced to the maximum
232. See supra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
233. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
234. 260 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2001).
235. See supra notes 149-54.
236. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (describing courts' treatment of
federal drug prisoners' Apprendi claims on direct review).
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penalty for a violation of the federal drug laws where drug quantity
was not specified.
This analytical approach provides a clear way of determining
what remedy, if any, should be given to an Apprendi claimant on
§ 2255 review. If a court inquires into the operation of a iule in a
given context to determine whether a rule is, in application,
procedural or substantive, rather than analyzing the rule in the
abstract for this determination, the result of that analysis will be more
legally precise and will thus aid a court in determining what remedy is
required. Whether the rule is in fact procedural or substantive is
not determinative of the availability of the rule under the extended
decision-time model, but such a finding would enhance the clarity of
the rule in application.
B. The Extended Decision-Time Model and Similarly Situated
Litigants
Recall that the Teague retroactivity analysis, defines "similarly
situated" defendants as those who are in the same procedural
posture.238  This Comment has argued that that definition of
"similarly situated" leads to inequitable results: Those defendants
with the same type of claim being treated dissimilarly.239 Under the
extended decision-time model, the initial analysis does not focus on
the procedural posture of a case. Rather, the choice of law
question-what rule should apply to the case before the court-is
governed by the principle that "[c]ourts should apply their current
best understanding of the law to all cases before them, regardless of
whether the best understanding at the time of the transaction [i.e.,
sentencing hearing,] would produce a different result. '240 Applying
this principle to an Apprendi claim brought in a § 2255 motion by a
237. Some courts, under current retroactivity analysis, have engaged in an analysis of
Apprendi similar to that proposed here and have concluded that Apprendi worked a
substantive change in the law, and thus would be available to petitioners on collateral
review. See Rosario v. United States, No. 00 Civ. 9695, 2001 WL 1006641, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 30, 2001) (discussing the effect of Apprendi and concluding that the rule "added
substantive elements to every criminal statute ... including the narcotics statutes at issue
here, [and therefore] is a substantive rule of law retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review").
238. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 164-74.
240. Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1117. This principle guides the development of
Professor Roosevelt's decision-time model. As noted supra Part III, however, Professor
Roosevelt does not extend this principle to collateral review because, in his view, the
purpose of collateral review is limited to asking whether the judgment was correct when
rendered. Id. at 1120.
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federal drug prisoner means simply that the Apprendi rule is available
to all petitioners, whether on direct or collateral review, as a basis to
directly challenge their sentences. However, the determination that
the Apprendi rule is available does not negate other procedural or
statutory requirements that any federal prisoner generally must meet
in order to file a § 2255 motion.241 It merely clarifies the question of
what law is available as a basis for a claim once those procedural and
statutory requirements are met.
As a result of applying the extended decision-time model,
similarly situated litigants-those with the same type of claim-are
treated similarly. Thus, in the example above where co-conspirators
Bob and Fred were convicted of drug offenses and received enhanced
sentences based on drug quantity determined on a preponderance of
the evidence at sentencing, the Apprendi rule would be available to
both Bob and Fred. This result would obtain despite Bob's
conviction becoming final prior to the Apprendi decision. While the
Teague plurality invoked the idea of "evenhanded justice" as
justification for a general rule of nonretroactivity for collateral
review,242 the application of the same rule to claimants bringing the
same type of claim arguably goes further toward advancing even
treatment of litigants.
C. Policy Considerations Under the Extended Decision-Time Model
1. Comity and Deterrence
This Comment has argued that the interests in comity and
deterrence should not drive the retroactivity doctrine in the federal
sentencing context primarily because (1) in the federal prisoner
context, there is no federalism concern because a federal court is not
reviewing a state court judgment;243 and (2) the deterrence function of
collateral review arguably is not served where a court entertaining a
241. For example, a petitioner who has not preserved his claim on direct review has
procedurally defaulted his claim and must show " 'cause' for the waiver" and " 'actual
prejudice ... from the ... violation" before being allowed to raise the claim on collateral
review. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 84 (1977). Another example of a procedural rule given full effect under the
extended decision-time model is the one-year statute of limitations in § 2255 for bringing
claims based on new rules of constitutional law. See supra notes 127-28.
242. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989).
243. See supra Part II.C.1. Recall that under both Professor Roosevelt's decision-time
model, and the extension of that model here to collateral review of sentencing
determinations, the correctness of a prior decision is preserved. See supra note 216 and
accompanying text.
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§ 2255 motion is the same court that initially imposed the sentence.244
Assuming, however, that these interests are significant, the proposed
extended decision-time model accounts for them.
The extended decision-time model does not create error in prior
proceedings, but applies current law to a petitioner whose claim is
that his present incarceration is unconstitutional.245 Thus, Bob would
concede that the court that imposed his original sentence was correct
under prevailing law at the time of his sentencing. Due to intervening
changes in the law, however, a current enhanced sentence, which the
prisoner is currently serving, effects a constitutional violation at the
point that the sentence enhancement imposed in violation of current
constitutional law begins. For example, if our hypothetical defendant,
Bob, is sentenced to forty years under § 841(b)(1)(B) where there had
been no finding of drug quantity by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
the constitutional injury would occur on the day after twenty years
had been served, when the increased penalty otherwise impermissible
under Apprendi begins.2 46 Thus, the crux of Bob's claim is not that his
conviction is unconstitutional, or even that his original sentencing
hearing was erroneous, but that a present or future constitutional
injury should be addressed under current law. Because the nature of
incarceration operates "in futuro, 'z47 the constitutional violation is
presently working a wrong. When Bob files a motion under § 2255 to
"test the legality of his detention '248 and is claiming that his sentence
is unconstitutionally long, Bob is attacking an "operative event,"
current incarceration, that is taking place now.249 Under the extended
decision-time model, a collateral attack claiming a sentence "in excess
of the maximum authorized by law '250 does not require that the
conviction of guilt be overturned, nor does it require that the original
sentencing determination by the judge be found erroneous; collateral
244. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (adopting Professor Meador's
argument that the challenge on collateral review is a challenge to a present, continuing
unconstitutional incarceration).
246. See supra notes 20, 23 (discussing the penalty structure of 21 U.S.C. § 841).
247. See Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1123. Professor Roosevelt, contrary to the model
advanced here, would require that the underlying conduct-the actual drug activity-be
held constitutionally protected in order for a prisoner to receive relief on collateral review
in this scenario. See id. As one court has noted, however, "a defendant may be 'actually
innocent' of a sentencing enhancement while guilty of the underlying offense." United
States v. Pittman, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 n.9 (D. Or. 2000).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
249. See Meador, supra note 227, at 1118.
250. See § 2255.
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attack only requires that a prisoner being constitutionally harmed
now be resentenced within current constitutional bounds.25'
Moreover, the fact that a judge is reviewing his own prior
sentencing determination supports the application of the extended
decision-time model in the § 2255 context. The question is not
whether error occurred in a prior proceeding, but what is the best
understanding of the law at the time the petition is filed. By applying
this model to the federal prisoner's Apprendi claim, the federal judge
need only treat the Apprendi rule as the current, best understanding
of what the Constitution demands. The judge is thus relieved from
the difficulty of assigning error to his own prior judgment. By
preserving the correctness of earlier judgments for the simple reason
that only current operative events and law are relevant, the legitimate
interest a federal judge may have in preserving his previous
judgments is adequately served. Furthermore, not only is any
possibility of actual bias significantly reduced, but any potential
appearance of bias is removed. Consequently, a federal judge's
decision may be viewed as more legitimate.
2. Finality
The interest in finality in the criminal process can be served by
restricting the availability of collateral review in general, or by
restricting the scope of that review in terms of what kinds of claims
can be heard. Arguably, the Teague Court sought just such a
restriction when it developed the current retroactivity analysis.2
This Comment argues that the scope and availability of collateral
review should be treated as issues separate and distinct from the
question of what law applies. Reliance on the fortuity of the
procedural posture of a case, even when combined with the value of
finality, is not an acceptable normative justification for non-
retroactivity. The interest in finality is always present, even on direct
251. If a prisoner is harmed by an Apprendi error, the current practice in federal court
when the Apprendi error comes to the court on direct review is to vacate the sentence and
remand for sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 673 (2d Cir. 2001)
(vacating a prisoner's 292 month drug sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and
remanding for re-sentencing pursuant to the twenty-year maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C)).
Under the "extended decision time model," the same result would obtain but the model
does not require a finding of error.
252. See supra notes 204-08 (discussing commentary critical of the Teague retroactivity
analysis as a method of restricting the scope of habeas corpus review).
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appeal, and that interest alone ordinarily should not be enough to
overcome a constitutional violation.
25 3
As noted above, however, finality in the criminal process is a
legitimate interest that is not completely denied or undercut by the
application of the extended decision-time model in the context of a
new constitutional rule affecting sentencing. Recall that our
defendant, Bob, charged with a violation of § 841 of the federal drug
statute,254 is exposed to a forty-year statutory maximum because a
judge found, on the preponderance of the evidence, that 5.00 grams of
crack were involved in his offense. On the other hand, Bob is subject
to a statutory maximum of twenty years if no specific drug quantity
was proved at sentencing.255 Bob's § 2255 claim based on Apprendi,
even if successful, leaves his conviction of guilt intact. The remedy
for such an error is merely a resentencing, not an automatic
reversal 6.25  Notably, both the plurality in Teague and Justice Harlan,
upon whom the Teague plurality relied, discussed the impact of
retroactivity on finality in terms of new procedural rules that affect
criminal "convictions" rather than "sentences. 257  Whatever
legitimate interests the criminal process has in respecting the finality
of an adjudication of guilt, that interest is not as strong when a new
constitutional rule, such as Apprendi, only affects a sentencing
determination. The strain on government resources will likely be less
in the case where only a resentencing determination need be made,
rather than a new trial held. Under current law, a prosecutor will
answer Bob's § 2255 Apprendi claim and a judge will engage in an in-
depth Teague retroactivity analysis in order to determine whether a
decision such as Apprendi applies to a case on collateral review. In
contrast, the extended decision-time model arguably places less strain
on the criminal process by (1) settling the question of what law
applies; (2) requiring only a straightforward application of the rule to
253. Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 1128. That finality cannot be a normative justification
for non-retroactivity is illustrated by the Supreme Court's Griffith holding that all new
rules should be applied to litigants on direct review. See supra notes 88-91 and
accompanying text (discussing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)).
254. 21 U.S.C. § 841.
255. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (explaining the operation of the
penalty structure under § 841).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 673 (2d Cir.) (holding that the
remedy for an Apprendi error is resentencing), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001).
257. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309-14 (1986) ("Application of constitutional
rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the
principle of finality .... ); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689 (1971) (arguing for
non-retroactivity on collateral review where procedures "utilized to convict" are not
fundamentally unfair).
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the facts of a case; and (3) allowing an application of harmless error
analysis.
Even if Bob has a valid Apprendi claim, his sentence will be
upheld if any constitutional error was harmless. The extended
decision-time model, as conceived here, does not preclude a harmless
error analysis. If, for example, a federal prisoner stipulated to drug
quantity at sentencing or overwhelming evidence of drug quantity
was presented at trial, a court could conclude that a federal prisoner's
sentence is correct even under current law. Accordingly, despite the
availability and application of Apprendi, the sentence is not effecting
a current constitutional wrong.
In order to accept the finality of a decision as an ultimate and
unyielding controlling value, one has to accept the position that even
unconstitutional incarcerations are acceptable. When a prisoner
claims a current unconstitutional incarceration and brings that claim
in the very federal court that initially imposed the sentence, the view
that finality overcomes a sentence too severe under current
constitutional standards is difficult to accept. This view becomes even
harder to accept because the current practice in the federal courts is
to remedy a sentencing determination based on a valid Apprendi
claim on direct review. 8
CONCLUSION
Viewing the Apprendi decision as one that adds the substantive
element of drug quantity to a violation of the federal drug laws for
purposes of sentencing, the test should not be whether the prisoner is
innocent of a violation of § 841, but whether his current sentence is
constitutional under current constitutional standards. 9
A habeas petitioner who was the victim of a genuine
Apprendi error meets this test. His imprisonment rests, at
least in part, on a purely judicial finding made using the
lowest standard of proof known to our judicial system. He
has thus been deprived of his liberty without the benefit of
258. See, e.g., Thomas, 274 F.3d at 673 (remanding for resentencing in light of a valid
Apprendi claim); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166-67 (5th Cir. 2000) (vacating
two life sentences imposed on a prisoner and remanding for resentencing for a term not to
exceed thirty years on each of the two counts), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1177 (2001).
259. See Rosario v. United States, 2001 WL 1006641, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2001)
(arguing that the appropriate retroactivity inquiry is whether there is "a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" and whether there are
"exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas
corpus is apparent") (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
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the heightened protections that are the hallmarks of a
criminal proceeding.260
The use of the extended decision-time model allows a court to
discover whether there is, in fact, an unconstitutional incarceration by
settling the initial decision of what law should apply to the
petitioner's § 2255 motion. A court can then proceed directly to
consider the merits of a claim and come to a more principled
judgment on whether resentencing is necessary.
Moreover, the extended decision-time model is not an attack on
the conviction of guilt itself and does not require resentencing in
every case. As a result, the proposed model takes into account the
principle of finality in criminal judgments. The other policy concerns
behind non-retroactivity of new constitutional sentencing rules-
respect for state court judgments and insuring that lower courts
comply with the Constitution-are not necessarily present in the
§ 2255 context. These latter concerns, therefore, do not provide a
persuasive justification for limiting the retroactivity of Apprendi in
the context of a federal drug prisoner's § 2255 motion.
If the scope of collateral review is the problem, then that
problem should be addressed directly. As the uneven treatment of
petitioners in § 2255 proceedings demonstrates, any attempt to solve
the policy questions driving the debate over post-conviction review by
further complicating the retroactivity doctrine only exacerbates the
very problems that the Court has attempted to rectify.
CHRISTOPHER S. STRAUSS
260. Id.
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